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JURISDICTION OF COURT OF APPEALS 
The Court has jurisdiction of this appeal under Utah Code Ann. § 78a-4-103(J). 
APPELLEE'S RESPONSE TO APPELLANT'S STATEMENT OF ISSUES AND 
STANDARDS OF REVIEW 
DCH's Statement of Issues fails to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate 
Procedure, which require an appellant to include not only a statement of the issues and 
standard of review, but also a "citation to the record showing that the issue was preserved 
in the trial court; or . . . a statement of grounds for seeking review of an issue not 
preserved in the trial court." Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(5)(A)&(B). Appellant's brief fails to 
satisfy this requirement. [Appellants Brief at 1]. Thus, the issue should not be 
considered by this Court. See West Valley City v. Majestic Inv. Co., 818 P.2d 1311, 
1316 (Utah Ct. App. 1991) (appellate arguments must be "explicitly tied to the record"). 
DCH likely did not attempt to satisfy Rule 24 because it did not preserve the issue 
for appeal— a review of the records demonstrates that DCH failed to object to Nielsen's 
admission of extrinsic evidence at the bench trial, and DCH questioned witnesses 
regarding the very testimony it now claims was inadmissible and improperly considered 
by the trial court. [R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial pp. 6, 11, 29, 38, 40, 44, 46, 55, 75, 
91]; See Id. at 1313 ("[c]omplaints about the introduction of parol evidence require an 
objection at trial in order to be raised on appeal"). 
Second, the Statement of Issue applies the wrong standard of review, in part 
because DCH frames the issue as an appeal of a legal conclusion, but DCH is actually 
challenging the trial court's finding of fact regarding the parties' obligations. 
i 
[Appellant's Brief at 1]. DCH argues the trial court "err[ed] in considering extrinsic 
evidence to reach the legal conclusion that the parties' agreement included a term not 
included in their integrated contract." [Appellant's Brief at 1]. However, as explained 
below, DCH's argument is a thinly-veiled attempt to have this Court second-guess the 
trial court's detailed findings of fact that while the contract is "silent" on this term, both 
parties contemplated and understood that DCH was obligated to obtain platting approval 
in time for closing on October 15, 2005. [Appellant's Brief at 2]. 
DCH argues that the issue is "reviewed for correctness without deference." 
[Appellant's Brief at 1]. In support of its argument, DCH cites Lund v. Hall in which the 
Utah Supreme Court held, "[w]e review the trial court's denial of a motion to reconsider 
summary judgment under rule 60(b) of the Utah Rules of Civil Procedures for abuse of 
discretion. In reviewing such a motion, we accord no deference to the trial court's 
conclusions of law but review them for correctness." 938 P.2d 285, 287 (Utah 
1997)(internal citations omitted). However, the issue in this case is not "such a motion," 
rather, the issue before the Court requires a review of both the trial court's findings of 
fact and conclusion of law, requiring a more deferential standard of review: 
[a] contract's interpretation may be either a question of law, determined 
by the words of the agreement, or a question of fact, determined by 
extrinsic evidence of intent. If a contract is not integrated oris 
ambiguous and the trial court finds facts regarding the parties' intent 
based on extrinsic evidence, we will not disturb the findings unless they 
are clearly erroneous. However, questions of contract interpretation not 
requiring resort to extrinsic evidence are matters of law, and on such 
questions we accord the trial court's interpretation no presumption of 
correctness. 
Fairbourn Commercial Inc. v. American Housing Partners, Inc., 2003 UT App. 98, f 13, 
68 P.3d 1038 (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added); see also Radman v. Flanders 
Corp., 2007 UT App. 351, % 5, 172 P.3d 668 ("[w]e review for correctness the trial 
court's legal conclusion that the contract is ambiguous. If a contract is deemed 
ambiguous, and the trial court allowed extrinsic evidence of intent, interpretation of the 
contract becomes a factual matter and our review is strictly limited") (internal citations 
omitted) (emphasis added); see also Bennett v. Huish, 2007 UT App. 19, ^  14, 155 P.3d 
917 ("whether evidence is admissible is a question of law, which we review for 
correctness, incorporating a clearly erroneous standard of review for the subsidiary 
factual determination of whether the parties adopted a writing as a complete integration 
of their agreement'')(emphasis added). Thus, consideration of the issue presented is a 
mixed question of fact and law. 
In regard to review of the trail court's findings of fact, "[o]n appeal from a bench 
trial, 'findings of fact . . . shall not be set aside unless clearly erroneous, and due regard 
shall be given to the opportunity of the trial court to judge the credibility of the 
witnesses.'" Tanner v. Carter, 2001 UT 18, % 2, 20 P.3d 332 (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 
52(a)). "For a reviewing court to find clear error, it must decide that the factual findings 
made by the trial court are not adequately supported by the record, resolving all disputes 
in the evidence in a light most favorable to the trial court's determination." State v. Pena, 
869 P.2d 932, 936 (Utah 1994). 
In this case, DCH challenges the trial court's consideration of extrinsic evidence to 
determine the parties' intent regarding the essential term of which party was responsible 
for obtaining subdividing and platting approval. As noted by the trial court in its 
Memorandum Decision denying the parties cross-motions for summary judgment, the 
contract is silent on this essential term, creating an ambiguity requiring a factual 
assessment to determine the parties' intent. [R. 192-195]. As such, DCH's challenge to 
the trial court's determination that the contract term was ambiguous is reviewed for 
correctness, but the trial court's findings of fact regarding the parties' intent are reviewed 
under the "clearly erroneous," and not the "correctness" standard. DCH has not 
marshaled any evidence that the trial court's determination that the Contract term was 
ambiguous was incorrect, and should be dismissed. 
DETERMINATIVE CONSTITUTIONAL PROVISIONS, 
STATUTES, ORDINANCES, RULES, AND REGULATIONS 
There are no determinative constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinance, rules and 
regulations regarding the issue on appeal other than the requirements of Utah Rule of 
Appellate Procedure 24. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
DCH Holdings, LLC ("DCH"), a land developer, entered into a contract to 
purchase a portion of Loren Nielsen's ("Nielsen") unplatted real property, together with an 
adjoining parcel owned by a third party. The purpose of the acquisition of these various 
parcels was to construct a real estate development. Since Nielsen's property was 
unplatted, applicable law clearly required that the portion of the property to be conveyed 
to DCH be platted and a separate parcel ID number be obtained. At the time that DCH 
prepared, presented, and executed the contract, both parties contemplated and understood 
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that it was DCH's responsibility to obtain preliminary and final plat approval. [R. 290-
294, Findings of Fact ffi[ 1-6, 9]. 
After entering into its contracts to purchase the various land for its planned 
development, DCH abandoned its development efforts. DCH never obtained either 
preliminary or final plat approval. Months after DCH abandoned its efforts to perform 
under the Nielsen contract, and only a few days before the stated expiration term of the 
contract, Sandy City announced that the new soccer stadium would be built on adjoining 
land. Although having earlier given up on the contract and its proposed development, 
DCH tried to close in order to take advantage of the anticipated opportunity to sell the 
property to the new stadium owners. DCH's efforts, however, were too little, too late, as 
due to DCH's failure to obtain plat approval of the subject property, the contract could 
not be consummated as a matter of law. As of October 15, 2005, DCH had not obtained 
plat approval, which was required for legal transfer of the parcel subject to the contract. 
It was DCH's responsibility to obtain plat approval in time to allow a closing on or before 
October 15, 2005. In addition, DCH did not close within the time required by the 
contract. [R. 290-294, Findings of Fact ffij 13-16]. 
DCH filed a complaint against Nielsen for causes of action for breach of contract, 
(seeking specific performance) and for breach of the covenant of good faith and fair 
dealing. [R. 1-18]. In or around April and May 2006, the parties filed cross-motions for 
summary judgment. [R. 35-37, 67-69]. In the Court's Memorandum Decision denying 
the parties' cross-motions for summary judgment, the trial court determined the contract 
was silent on the issue of which party was responsible for the obligation regarding 
subdivision and plat recordation, requiring a "factual assessment and may involve the 
introduction of parol evidence to discern the parties' intent." [R. 192-194]. 
Accordingly, at the bench trial both DCH and Nielsen presented evidence of the 
parties' intent and understanding regarding the subdivision and platting process. DCH 
did not object to the admission of parol evidence at the trial, and counsel for DCH 
examined Nielsen regarding his understanding and intent regarding responsibility for 
platting and subdividing at the time of entering the agreement. After hearing the 
evidence presented by both sides, the trial court announced it finding of fact that "it was 
DCH's responsibility to obtain plat approval in time to allow a closing on or before 
October 15, 2005." [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact f 20]. DCH's claims were dismissed 
with prejudice and the trial court determined that Nielsen was contractual entitled to 
retain the $2,500 deposit and to an award of attorneys fees and costs in defending DCH's 
claims. [R. 290-294, Conclusions of Law fflf 4-5,7]. 
On appeal DCH challenges a single issue, the district court's "consideration] of 
extrinsic evidence to reach the legal conclusion that the parties' agreement included a 
term not included in their integrated contract." [Appellant's Brief at 2]. DCH's appeal 
should be dismissed on both procedural and substantive grounds: by failing to object to 
the admission of extrinsic evidence at trial DCH did not preserve the issue for appeal, and 
the trial court properly admitted the extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent 
regarding an essential but ambiguous term of the agreement. [R. 345, Transcript of Bench 
Trial pp. 6, 11, 29, 38, 40,44,46, 55, 75, 91]. 
APPELLEE'S STATEMENT OF FACTS 
First, DCH's Statement of the Case is incomplete, and fails to comply with the 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, which require an appellant to include a statement of 
the facts relevant to the issues presented for review, supported by citations to the record. 
Utah R. App. P. 24(a)(7). Nielsen provides the following statement of facts relevant to 
the issue presented for review: 
1. Nielsen owns approximately 9.66 acres of real property located in Sandy 
City, Utah at 9265 South Monroe Street (the "Undivided Parcel"). [R. 290-294, Finding 
of Fact 1f 1]. 
2. Prior to May 2005, DCH became interested in developing a Planned Unit 
Development townhouse development in Sandy, Utah (the "Townhouse Development") 
on land owned by several different owners. [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact ^ 2]. 
3. To accomplish its purpose, it was necessary for DCH to acquire the land 
from the various property owners on which the Townhouse Project would be located [R. 
290-294, Finding of Fact If 2]. 
4. A portion of the land needed for the Townhouse Development was 
approximately 2.5 acres of the Undivided Property owned by Nielsen (the "Townhouse 
Parcel"). [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact 1j 2]. 
5. DCH is owned principally by David C. Helm. Mr. Helm is a long-standing 
real estate broker and developer. [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact % 3]. 
6. Nielsen is not, and has never been, a real estate professional. [R. 290-294, 
Finding of Fact If 4] 
7. On May 6, 2005, Helm prepared and presented Nielsen with (1) a Real 
Estate Purchase Contract— Land (the "Contract"), which contained DCH's offer to 
purchase an estimated 2.46 acre portion comprising the expected Townhouse Parcel for 
$6.10 per square foot (estimated total of $653,661.36) and (2) an earnest money check of 
$2,500.00. [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact ^ 5] 
8. The offer was accepted on May 6, 2005 in the form prepared by Helm. [R. 
290-294, Finding of Fact ^ 6] 
9. The salient terms of the Contract were as follows: 
a. A purchase price of $6.10 per foot (with the exact amount to be 
determined when the exact size was determined later) [R. 290-294, 
Finding of Fact *| 7a]; 
b. $2,500 initial earnest money, with $10,000 to be due upon 
preliminary plat approval [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact f 7b]; 
c. Closing to be on or before twenty days after final plat approval, with 
an outside date of October 15, 2005 [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact f 
7c]; 
d. The offer was conditioned on the acceptance by an adjoining 
landowner (Terry Thatcher) of an offer to purchase his property [R. 
290-294, Finding of Fact ^ 7d]; 
e. In the event of DCH's default, Nielsen could elect to retain the 
earnest money as liquidated damages [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact f 
7e]; and 
f. In the event of litigation to enforce the Contract, the prevailing party 
would be entitled to reasonable attorney fess and costs [R. 290-294, 
Finding of Fact j^ 7f]. 
10. At the time the Contract was prepared and presented by Helm, it was 
understood that the Townhouse Parcel was not a separate parcel but part of the larger 
Undivided Property. [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact ^ 8]. 
11. At the time the contract was signed, both parties contemplated and 
understood that it was DCH's responsibility to obtain preliminary and final plat approval. 
[R. 290-294, Finding of Fact % 9]. 
12. The plat approval process would have resulted in a subdivision of the 
Townhouse Parcel from the Undivided Parcel. [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact ^ 10]. 
13. At the time of the execution of the contract, other than for discussions in 
which DCH assumed responsibility for the plat approval process, there were no 
discussions specifically mentioning "subdividing" the Undivided Parcel. [R. 290-294, 
Findings of Fact Tf 11]. 
14. Helm informed Nielsen that Mr. Thatcher also accepted Helm's offer. [R. 
290-294, Finding of Fact ^ 12]. 
15. Following execution of the Contract, Helm took the following action: 
a. Contracted with an engineering company to obtain a survey of the 
proposed Townhouse Development, including the Townhouse Parcel 
[R. 290-294, Finding of Fact f 13a]; 
o 
b. Contracted with an engineering company to obtain a topography of 
the Townhouse Development, including the Townhouse Parcel [R. 
290-294, Finding of Fact f 13b]; 
c. Contracted with an engineering company to prepare a subdivision 
plan [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact Tf 13c]; 
d. On May 12, 2005, submitted a re-zoning application to Sandy City 
involving the Townhouse Parcel [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact f^ 
13d]; and 
e. Participated in meeting and hearings with Sandy City regarding 
potential plat and zoning approval relating to the Townhouse 
Development and Townhouse Parcel [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact f^ 
13e]. 
16. Following Nielsen's acceptance of the Contract on May 6, 2005, Nielsen 
did not hear from Helm again until October 14, 2005. [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact 114]. 
17. Not hearing from DCH for months, Nielsen reasonably believed that DCH 
had abandoned its plans to purchase and develop the Townhouse Parcel. [R. 252, 
Relevant Fact % 18]. 
18. DCH did not obtain either preliminary or final plat approval of the 
Townhouse Development or the Townhouse Parcel. [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact If 15]. 
19. DCH did not pay the sums under the Contract due upon plat approval. [R. 
290-294, Finding of Fact ^ 16]. 
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20. On October 11, 2005, Sandy City announced plans for the construction of a 
soccer stadium adjacent to the Undivided Property. [R. 253, Relevant Fact *[( 22]. 
21. At approximately 2:31 p.m. on October 14, 2005, DCH sent a facsimile to 
Nielsen's office, which informed him that DCH was "closing our half of the closing 
today 10/14/05 at 3:00 p.m." and that DCH had set a closing date for the Nielsens at 
10:00 a.m. on October 17, 2005, at 10:00 a.m. [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact f 17]. 
22. Nielsen was not in his office on the afternoon of October 14, 2005. He first 
saw the facsimile late in the day on October 15, 2005. [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact f^ 
18]. 
23. No prior notice of this "closing" had been provided to Nielsen. In fact, this 
was the first time Nielsen had even heard from DCH since accepting the offer on May 6, 
2005. [R. 253, Relevant Fact f 25]. 
24. As of October 15, 2005, there were a number of unfinished items that were 
required in order to close the transaction, such as: 
a. Subdivision plat approval, which was required for legal transfer of the 
Townhouse Parcel [R. 253, Finding of Fact % 19]; 
b. Release of the Parcel from the Wells Fargo Bank lien [R. 253, 
Relevant Fact % 26]; 
c. Determination of the exact size and legal description of the Parcel and 
the resulting purchase price [R. 253, Relevant Fact f 26]; and 
d. Nielsen's review and approval of settlement documents, [R. 254, 
Relevant Fact f 26]. 
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25. It was DCH's responsibility to obtain plat approval and approval for the 
subdivision of the Townhouse Parcel from the Undivided Parcel in time to allow a closing 
prior to October 15, 2005. [R. 290-294, Finding of Fact ^ 20]. 
26. On November 9, 2005, DCH filed a Complaint against Nielsen for breach 
of contract and breach of the covenant of good faith and fair dealing. [R. 1-18]. 
27. The parties filed cross- motions for Summary Judgment, which came 
before the trail court for hearing on September 18, 2006. [R. 35-37, 67-69, 191]. 
28. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court took the matter under 
advisement, and announced its ruling in a Memorandum Decision filed October 31, 2006. 
[R. 191-195]. In its ruling, the Court denied the cross- motions, specifically ruling that 
the Contract is silent on the crucial undertaking of responsibility regarding the 
subdividing and plat recording process, and that the parties intent would have to be 
discerned from a factual assessment, contemplating the need for the introduction of parol 
evidence regarding the ambiguity, 
It is undisputed that since the defendant's property was unplatted 
and only a portion of the property was to be conveyed under the 
REPC (2.4 out of a 9.6 acre parcel), Utah law required that the 
entire property be subdivided and platted . . . The pivotal issue 
presented by the parties' dual Motion for Summary Judgment is 
which of the parties was charged with the responsibility of 
subdividing the land and obtaining the requisite approvals for the 
type of development project contemplated by the REPC . . . the 
parties must themselves reach an agreement on their respective 
obligations. In this case, however, the REPC is silent on this 
point. This silence suggests that the parties may not have 
reached a meeting of the minds on the crucial terms of who 
would be undertaking which responsibility in the subdivision and 
plat recordation process. This issue requires a factual assessment 
12 
and may involve the introduction of parol evidence to discern the 
parties' intent... [R. 191-194](emphasis added) 
29. A Bench Trial was held on June 5, 2008. [R. 286-287]. 
30. During the trial, both parties testified as to their understanding regarding 
the platting and subdividing requirement at the time the Contract was entered, as well as 
DCH's efforts to accomplish the subdivision and platting requirements after the Contract 
was entered. [R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial pp. 6, 11, 29, 38,40, 44,46, 55, 75, 91]. 
31. Counsel for DCH did not object to the admission of evidence regarding the 
parties' communications, understanding and intent regarding subdividing and platting at 
the time of entering the Contract. [R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial pp. 6, 11, 29, 38, 40, 
44, 46, 55, 75, 91]. Specifically, DCH's counsel did not object to the following evidence 
(counsel for Nielsen questioning David Helms of DCH): 
Q. You told [Nielsen] that it needed to be - it would need to be re-
zoned? 
A. To build the townhouses, yes. 
Q. And you told [Nielsen] that you were going to have to get plat 
approval? 
A. I did. 
[R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial, p. 29] (emphasis added). 
Q. When you prepared Exhibit 1 you understood that this property and 
the other properties were going to be part of a plat DCH Holdings was 
going to prepare? 
A. That's Right. 
Q. And you understand that DCH was going to take responsibility for 
getting the zoning changed for it? 
A. I did get it changed. 
Q. That- and it was DCH's - was the party responsible for that? 
A. Uh-huh (affirmative). 
n 
[R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial, p. 38] (emphasis added). 
Q. You did not tell Mr. Nielsen you expected him to plat anything? 
A. No, I didn't. 
Q. And as of [the date of the Contract] you believed you would get the 
plat approval by the time to close the contract on October 15 ? 
[R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial, p. 44] (emphasis added). 
Q. You see where there's a settlement deadline written 10-15-05, that's 
your date selected, is it not? 
A. Right. 
Q. All Right. And you picked that date thinking you could comply with 
the plat requirements by that time? 
A. I did. 
[R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial, p. 46] (emphasis added). 
32. Further, DCH's counsel solicited testimony from the parties regarding their 
understanding and intent regarding the responsibility to subdivide and plat at the time of 
entering the Contract: 
Q. At any rate, my question simply was, was there any discussion about 
whose responsibility it would be to subdivide the property if that was 
necessary? 
[R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial p. 11]. 
Q. Well, there was no discussion about having some legal requirement 
that it be divided was there? 
A. [Mr. Nielsen] I think-1 think there was an understanding that that 
property would need to be legally defined in order to be sold. 
Q. All right. But a legal definition could be a metes and bounds 
description in your mind as of that time, could it not? 
Mr. Miller: Objection, he's calling for a legal conclusion. 
Mr. Eckersley: I'm just asking what his understanding was. 
1 A 
The Court: Yeah, and I will only take it for what that's worth. 
[R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial p. 74](emphasis added). 
33. At the conclusion of the bench trial the trial court requested the parties 
submit proposed findings. [R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial, p. 123]. 
34. Upon considering the evidence and argument of counsel, the trial court 
made the finding of fact that the responsibility to obtain preliminary and final plat 
approval was DCH's [R. 290-294, Findings of Fact ^[ 9, 20] and made the following 
conclusions of law: 
a. Conveyance of the unplatted Townhouse Parcel required approval of 
a subdivision plat, subdividing the Townhouse Parcel from the 
Undivided Property. [R. 290-294, Conclusion of Law 11]; 
b. DCH's failure to obtain plat approval within the time to allow a 
closing by October 15, 2005, constituted a breach of the Agreement 
and excused Mr. Nielsen's obligation to perform, including any 
obligation to convey title to the unplatted Townhouse Parcel. [R. 
290-294, Conclusion of Law ^ 2]; 
c. Because conveyance of an unplatted property is a violation of law, 
the Court should not compel Nielsen to perform an unlawful act. [R. 
290-294, Conclusion of Law % 3]; 
d. Nielsen is entitled to retain the $2,500 earnest money deposit. [R. 
290-294, Conclusion of Law f 4]; 
1 ^ 
e. DCH's complaint should be dismissed, with prejudice [R. 290-294, 
Conclusion of Law j^ 5]; 
f. Mr. Nielsen is the prevailing party [R. 290-294, Conclusion of Law 
1[6]; and 
g. Mr. Nielsen is entitled to recover his costs and attorney's fees, in an 
amount of be determined by the Court in accordance with Rule 73 of 
the Utah Rules of Civil Procedure [R. 290-294, Conclusion of Law 1 
7]. 
35. The trial court entered Judgment on September 29, 2008 [R. 324-326]. In 
the Judgment the Court awarded Nielsen his attorney fees and costs pursuant to the 
written attorney fee provision in the Contract, as well as all "attorneys fees in collecting 
and otherwise enforcing th[e] judgment." [R. 324-326]. 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
As a procedural matter, DCH's appeal should be dismissed for failure to preserve 
the issue being appealed, and for complete failure to satisfy its burden to marshal the 
evidence. As a substantive matter, DCH's appeal should be dismissed because DCH's 
argument regarding the parol evidence rule is an incomplete analysis of the law, and the 
trial court properly considered extrinsic evidence related to which party bore 
responsibility for subdividing and platting the Townhouse Parcel— an essential term of 
the Contract on which the written agreement was silent. 
It is undisputed that in order for DCH to purchase approximately 2.5 acres of 
Nielsen's 9.6 acre parcel, the Townhouse Parcel would first have to be subdivided from 
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the Undivided Parcel. It is also undisputed that the parties' written agreement is silent as 
to which party was responsible for obtaining the necessary subdivision approval and 
plats. In denying summary judgment, the trial court correctly found that the Contract's 
"silence" on the essential term required a "factual assessment and may involve the 
introduction of parol evidence to discern the parties' intent." 
When an agreement is missing an essential term, the introduction of parol 
evidence may be required to determine the parties' intent regarding the missing term. An 
integration clause in a written contract does not preclude the finder of fact from 
considering extrinsic evidence to determine the parties' intent regarding an essential term 
that is missing from the written agreement or is ambiguous. As such, it was necessary 
and proper for the trial court to consider extrinsic evidence to determine whether there 
was a meeting of the minds between DCH and Nielsen, and if so, to determine the parties 
understanding and intent regarding this missing term. DCH did not object to admission 
of the extrinsic evidence at trial, and even offered its own evidence regarding the parties 
understanding and intent. 
The trial court appropriately deduced the parties' intent regarding the obligation of 
subdividing and platting the Townhouse Parcel by considering the testimony of the 
parties regarding their respective understandings at the time the agreement was entered, 
and also considered DCH's actions after the Contract. The Court determined that the 
parties' understood and intended that DCH was responsible for subdividing and platting. 
DCH's argument that an ambiguity regarding an essential term of the agreement cannot 
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be supplemented with extrinsic evidence of the parties' intent is a misstatement of the 
law, and was not preserved for appeal, and this appeal should be dismissed. 
ARGUMENT 
I. DCH'S APPEAL SHOULD BE DISMISSED FOR PROCEDURAL 
DEFICIENCIES, FAILURE TO SATISFY ITS APPELLANT BURDEN TO 
MARSHAL RELEVANT EVIDENCE, AND FAILURE TO PRESERVE 
THE ISSUE FOR APPEAL. 
a. DCH failed to satisfy the requirements of Rule 24 of the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure. 
It is an appellate court's "prerogative to affirm the lower court decision solely on 
the basis of failure to comply with the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure." Majestic Inv. 
Co.. 818 P.2d at 1313, fh 1. In its Appellant Brief, DCH failed to comply with the Utah 
Rules of Appellate Procedure as follows: DCH failed to attempt to satisfy Rule 
24(a)(5)(A)'s requirement of citation to the "record showing that the issue was preserved 
in the trial court" or Rule 24(a)(5)(B)'s "statement of grounds for seeking review of an 
issue not preserved;" DCH failed to address Rule 24(a)(6)'s requirement regarding citing 
constitutional provisions, statutes, ordinances, rules, and regulations; DCH failed to 
include a statement of the facts relevant to the issues presented for review with citations 
to the record pursuant to Rule 24(a)(7); and to the extent DCH is really challenging the 
trial court's finding of fact, DCH failed to "marshal all record evidence that supports the 
challenge evidence" in its argument as required by Rule 24(a)(9), and under the same 
subpart failed to include grounds for reviewing an issue not preserved in the trial court. 
[Appellant's Brief, i-5]. 
1Q 
b. DCH does not attempt to marshal relevant evidence in 
satisfaction of its substantial appellate burden. 
DCH failed to make any effort to satisfy its substantial appellate burden. [See 
Appellant's Brief, 1-5]. "If the appellant fails to marshal the evidence, the appellate court 
assumes that the record supports the findings of the trial court." See Saunders v. Sharp, 
806 P.2d 198, 199 (Utah 1991)). In regard to appellate review of interpretation of an 
ambiguous term of contract, 
[a] party challenging the court's interpretation of ambiguous terms of a 
contract faces a substantial appellate burden. We affirm the trial court's 
findings if they are based on sufficient evidence, viewing the evidence 
in the light most favorable to the trial court's construction. The 
challenging party must marshal all relevant evidence presented at trial 
which tends to support the findings and demonstrate why the findings 
and clearly erroneous. We have shown no reluctance to affirm when the 
appellant fails to adequately marshal the evidence. 
# * * 
. . . In order to properly discharge the duty of marshaling the evidence, 
the challenger must present, incomprehensive and fastidious order, 
every scrap of competent evidence introduced at trial which supports 
the very findings the appellant resists. After constructing this 
magnificent array of supporting evidence, the challenger must ferret out 
a fatal flaw in the evidence. The gravity of this flaw must be sufficient 
to convince the appellate court that the court's finding resting upon the 
evidence is clearly erroneous. 
Majestic Invest. Co., 818 P.2d at 1313, 1315 (internal citations omitted) (emphasis in 
original). DCH falls far-short of its burden of marshaling all relevant evidence presented 
at trial to demonstrate why the court's finding was clearly erroneous— in fact, DCH fails 
to marshal any evidence presented at trial. [Appellant's Brief at 1-6]. DCH does not so 
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much as include a statement of facts relevant to the issue before the Court. [Appellant's 
Brief at 1-6]. 
c. DCH did not preserve the issue for appeal, and did not set forth 
grounds for review of an issue not preserved. 
As set forth above in "Appellee's Response to Appellant's Statement of Issue and 
Standard of Review," DCH did not preserve the issue regarding admission of extrinsic 
evidence at the trial level, and has failed to set forth grounds for review of an issue not 
preserved for appeal. See Co-Vest Corp. v. Corbett 735 P.2d 1308, 1309 (Utah 
1987)("[b]ecause defendants did not object to the extrinsic evidence at the trial level, they 
cannot claim on appeal that the document is clear and unambiguous and is not subject to 
interpretation with extrinsic evidence"); see also Matter of Estate of Justheim, 824 P.2d 
432, 435 fh4 (Utah Ct. App. 1991)(issue regarding admissibility of parol evidence not 
preserved for appeal when evidence was submitted at trial without objection, as a party 
cannot have the benefit of not objecting at trial and appellate review). DCH failed to 
preserve the issue for appeal when it did not object to the admission of extrinsic evidence 
at trial, and counsel for DCH solicited testimony on the very topic it is now objecting to. 
[R. 345, Transcript of Bench Trial pp. 6, 11, 29, 38, 40, 44, 46, 55, 75, 91]. 
EL THE DISTRICT COURT PROPERLY CONSIDERED EXTRINSIC 
EVIDENCE TO DETERMINE THE PARTIES' INTENT REGARDING A 
MISSING TERM IN THE WRITTEN CONTRACT. 
In the Court's Memorandum Decision following the parties' cross motions for 
summary judgment, the Court found that the written contract omitted an essential term -
which party was responsible to undertake the required platting process: 
[T]he REPC is silent on this point. This silence suggests that the parties 
may not have reached a meeting of the minds on the crucial terms of who 
would be undertaking which responsibility in the subdivision and plat 
recordation process. This issue requires a factual assessment and may 
involve the introduction of parol evidence to discern the parties' intent. 
[R. 191-194, Memorandum Decision p. 3]. Thus, a trial was held for the purpose of 
considering such parol evidence and determining this missing portion of the parties' 
written agreement. Not only did DCH not object to the introduction of parol evidence, 
but actively participated in soliciting such testimony. 
In its Appellant Brief, DCH acknowledges that at the trial following the 
Memorandum Decision, the trial court made findings of fact regarding a term on which 
the written contract is silent: 
[t]he trial court made a factual finding that DCH has a contractual 
obligation to obtain plat approval for the subject property prior to 
October 15, 2005. The problem with this finding is that it is not a part 
of the parties' written contract.... 
[Appellant's Brief at 3-4]. Without marshalling the evidence, DCH is essentially 
challenging the Court's finding that the contract was silent as to a critical term - what 
party was required to subdivide the land. In addition, contrary to DCH's claim, the parol 
evidence rule does not prohibit the trial court to consider evidence necessary to fill in 
omitted terms. 
a. DCH's analysis of the parol evidence rule is incomplete. 
In support of its argument on appeal, DCH quotes case law stating that extrinsic 
evidence may not be considered to vary or contradict terms to an integrated contract, and 
argues that because the Contract contained an integration clause, extrinsic evidence could 
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not be considered by the trial court. [Appellant Brief at 3-5 (citing Tangren Family Trust 
v. Tangren, 2008 UT 20, If 11; Novell Inc. v. Canopy Group. Inc.. 2004 UT App. 162, Tj 
10)]. However, DCH's analysis and quotation of controlling case law is truncated, and 
omits the second part or "prong" of the parol evidence rule which provides that even 
when a contract is integrated, extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify or supplement 
ambiguous or missing terms of the contract in order to ascertain the true intentions of the 
parties to the contract. See Tangren, 2008 UT 20, ^18 ("[i]f the terms are ambiguous, 
extrinsic evidence is admissible to clarify the meaning of those terms"); see Novell 2004 
UT App. 162,120 ("[t]he underlying purpose in construing or interpreting a contract is 
to ascertain the intentions of the parties to the contract... if the language of the contract 
is ambiguous such that the intentions of the parties cannot be determined by the plain 
language of the agreement, extrinsic evidence must be looked to in order to determine the 
intentions of the parties. If a contract is ambiguous, the court may consider the parties' 
action and performance as evidence of the parties' true intention")(internal citations 
omitted)(emphasis added). 
DCH quotes the following language from the Tangren decision, 
as a principal of contract interpretation, the parol evidence rule has a very 
narrow application. Simply stated, the rule operated, in the absence of 
fraud or other invalidating causes, to exclude evidence of contemporaneous 
conversations, representations, or statements offered for the purpose of 
varying or adding to the terms of an integrated contract. 
[Appellant Brief at 3]. However, DCH omits the remainder of paragraph 11 of the 
Tangren decision which further explains, 
[t]hus, if a contract is integrated parol evidence is admissible only to 
clarify ambiguous terms; it is 'not admissible to vary or contradict the 
clear and unambiguous terms of the contract. The application of the parol 
evidence rule is therefore a two-step process: 'First, the court must 
determine whether the agreement is integrated. If the court finds the 
agreement is integrated, then parol evidence may be admitted onlyjf the 
court make a subsequent determination that the language of the agreement 
is ambiguous. 
Tangren, at ^ 11 (emphasis added). The Tangren decision further provides, 
[w]here a contract by an explicit term purports to be integrated, we will 
nevertheless allow extrinsic evidence in support of an argument that the 
contract is not, in fact, valid for certain reason as that we have specified. 
We have held that extrinsic evidence is appropriately considered, even in 
the face of a clear integration clause, where the contract is . . . voidable 
for fraud, duress, mistake or illegality In other words, a written 
contract could purport to constitute the complete understanding of the 
parties, yet nevertheless be invalid because it is a forgery, a joke, a sham, 
or the result of fraud, duress, mistake or illegality. 
Tangren at f^ 15 (emphasis added). Therefore, under Tangren, extrinsic evidence 
is appropriately considered to clarify the meaning of ambiguous terms of an 
integrated contract. Tangren at ^ 11,18. Further, even when a contract purports to 
be integrated, a court may consider extrinsic evidence in determining whether the 
contract is void for illegality. Tangren at f^ 15. 
DCH also relies on the Novell decision, correctly arguing that parol 
evidence is inadmissible "so far as it contradicts or is inconsistent" with the 
written terms of an integrated agreement, [Appellant Brief at 5 (citing Novell, Inc. 
v. Canopy Group. Inc. 2004 UT App. 162, % 11)]. However, DCH omits the 
Novell court's explanation that 
parol evidence not inconsistent with the writing is admissible to show what the 
entire contract really was, by supplementing, as distinguished from 
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contradicting, the writing. In such a case parol evidence to prove the part not 
reduced to writing is admissible, although it is not admissible as to the part 
reduced to writing. 
Novell Inc. v. Canopy Group, Inc, 2004 UT App. 162, f 15 (emphasis added). 
A contract "is ambiguous if it is capable of more than one reasonable 
interpretation because of 'uncertain meanings or terms, missing terms, or other facial 
deficiencies." Nielsen v. Gold's Gym, 2003 UT 37,U 7, 78 P.3d 600 (emphasis added). 
"When determining whether a contract term is ambiguous, the court is not limited to the 
contract itself. Relevant extrinsic evidence of the facts known to the parties at the time 
they entered the [contract] is admissible to assist the court in determining whether the 
contract is ambiguous." Id. (internal citations omitted)(emphasis added). 
DCH's argument that "the only issue before the trial court was whether the parties 
performed according to its express terms" ignores the basic principles of the parol 
evidence rule. [See Appellant Brief at 4]. The Contract does not define the parties' 
responsibilities regarding the subdividing and platting necessary for Townhouse Parcel to 
be conveyed to DCH. [See Appellant Brief, Exhibit "1"]. It cannot be disputed that the 
Contract is ambiguous when it is missing a term essential to performance. The fact that 
the act of subdivision must have been performed in order to lawfully consummate the 
contract is not challenged by Appellant. Neither does the Appellant challenge the Trial 
Court's conclusion as to this requirement. [See R. 290-294, Conclusion of Law f^ 3] 
("conveyance of an unplatted property is a violation of law"). 
If, as Appellant suggests, the Contract did not omit any necessary terms, then the 
Contract called for an illegal act - the conveyance of a portion of land from a larger 
parcel without complying with the required subdivision process. The Townhouse Parcel 
that DCH wanted to initially purchase was not a separate parcel, but part of a larger 
acreage. The process of dividing a portion of land from a larger parcel is called 
"subdividing." Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9a-103(35)(a), 17-27a-103(38)(a). When land is 
subdivided, a specified process of obtaining and recording an accepted plat is required. 
Utah Code Ann. §§ 10-9a-603, 17-27a-603. Any attempted transfer of a portion of a 
parcel without complying with the subdivision platting requirements is unlawful. Utah 
Code Ann. §§ 10-9a-611, 17-27a-611 ("[a]n owner of land located in a subdivision who 
transfers or sells any land in that subdivision before a plat of the subdivision has been 
approved and recorded violates this part for each lot or parcel transferred or sold.") 
Violations by sellers are punishable as Class C misdemeanors. Utah Code Ann. §§10-
9a-903, 17-27a-803. Likewise, the Sandy City Land Development Code (the Parcel is 
located within Sandy City) unequivocally provides that: 
It shall be unlawful to transfer, sell, convey, gift or assign any 
subdivided property as defined in this Chapter before a final 
subdivision plat is approved and recorded pursuant to the 
requirements of this Chapter and applicable State law. . . . 
As such, under Utah's parol evidence rule, the trial court properly admitted 
extrinsic evidence on the parties' responsibilities regarding subdividing and platting 
necessary to convey the Townhouse Parcel for the purposes of determining whether the 
contract term was ambiguous, for "clarification of an ambiguous term" and for 
determining whether the contract was "invalidated due to illegality." Tangren at ffl[ 15,18; 
Gold's Gym, at f^ 7. Further, the parol evidence rule is "narrow in application" and does 
not apply to prohibit the introduction of the extrinsic evidence admitted in this case, as 
the evidence was not inconsistent with, contradictory to, and did not vary the clear 
language of the written Contract, but rather was used by both parties to supplement a 
missing, and therefore ambiguous, term of the Contract. 
Regardless, DCH's appeal of the issue of whether the Court improperly admitted 
extrinsic evidence in interpreting an integrated contract is futile, as even without the 
admission of the extrinsic evidence the Contract is still missing an essential term, making 
the Contract unenforceable or voidable for illegality. The trial court correctly concluded 
that Conveyance of the unplatted Townhouse Parcel required approval of a subdivision 
plat, subdividing the Townhouse Parcel from the Undivided Property [R. 290-294, 
Conclusion of Law f^ 1], and that conveyance of an unplatted property is a violation of 
law, and the Court should not compel Nielsen to perform an unlawful act. [R. 290-294, 
Conclusion of Law ^[3]. DCH did not appeal the trial court's conclusions of law. [See 
Appellant Brief at 1-6]. Therefore, if DCH is successful on appeal and the matter is 
remanded to the trial court, even without consideration of the extrinsic evidence the 
Contract will still be silent regarding the obligation to subdivide and plat the Townhouse 
Parcel, Nielsen still will not have breached an obligation under the Contract, and DCH 
will still be unable to compel specific performance of an unlawful act. 
Finally, DCH masks, but does not abandon, its real contention - that the trial court 
improperly rejected DCH's claim that Nielsen was the party obligated to obtain plat 
approval as the "unplatted" nature of the Townhouse Parcel was an alleged "impediment" 
to conveyance of marketable title. [Appellant's Brief at 5] ("To the degree that Nielsen 
claims he was unable to convey title . . . it was his obligation to cure that impediment... 
Nielsen's promise to convey marketable title places the burden on him to remove any 
impediments from his ability to do so"). However, the trial court made its finding of fact 
on this issue, which finding is subject to substantial deference. See Tanner, 2001 UT 18 
at f^ 2. The trial court considered the testimony, and made clear and unequivocal findings 
of fact that "at the time the contract was signed, both parties contemplated and 
understood that it was DCH's responsibility to obtain preliminary and final plat approval 
and that "it was DCH's responsibility to obtain plat approval in time to allow a closing on 
or before October 15, 2005." [R. 290-294, Findings of Fact ffif 9, 20]. l 
In sum, the trial court correctly determined that the written agreement was 
ambiguous on an essential term and properly admitted extrinsic evidence, which evidence 
1
 DCH confuses the concept of title (ownership) with land entitlement requirements. 
Title is legal evidence of a person's ownership rights in a property. Black's Law 
Dictionary (8th ed. 2004). Marketable title merely means title is held by the seller and the 
property is free and clear of liens and encumbrances. As stated by American 
Jurisprudence, 2d: 
Marketability of title is concerned with impairments on title to a 
property, i.e., the right to unencumbered ownership and possession. 
A "marketable title" is one that can be held or possessed in peace 
and quiet. A title which has no defects of a serious nature, and none 
which affect the possessory title of the owner, ought to be adjudged 
"marketable." . . . There is a difference between economic lack of 
marketability, which concerns conditions that affect the use of land, 
and title marketability, which relates to defects affecting legally 
recognized rights and incidents of ownership. 
77 Am Jur 2d Vendor and Purchaser §103 (2008). There is no dispute in this case 
that Nielsen had fee simple title - marketable title - to the subject land. 
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did not contradict or vary the terms of the written agreement. The admission of extrinsic 
evidence was necessary to determine the parties' intent and understanding so that the trial 
court could determine whether there was a meeting of the minds sufficient to form a 
contract. The trial court found that there was a meeting of the minds, and that the parties 
intended and understood that the responsibility regarding platting and subdividing was 
DCH's. The trial court's findings of fact are accorded substantial deference, and DCH's 
appeal should be dismissed. 
III. NIELSEN IS ENTITLED TO RECOVER ATTORNEY FEES AND COSTS 
INCURRED ON APPEAL 
The trial court awarded Nielsen his attorney fees and costs pursuant to the written 
attorney fee provision in the Contract, as well as all "attorneys fees in collecting and 
otherwise enforcing th[e] judgment." [R. 324-326]. DCH does not appeal the trial court's 
award of attorney fees and costs. [Appellant's Brief at 1 (Statement of Issues)]. 
As noted, the judgment should be affirmed. Thus, Nielsen is entitled to recover 
his fees incurred on appeal. See R&R Energies v. Mother Earth Indus., Inc., 936 P.2d 
1068, 1081 (Utah 1997) (where party entitled to attorney fees below prevails on appeal, 
award of attorney fees on appeal is proper); Management Servs. Corp. v. Development 
Assocs., 617 P.2d 406, 409 (Utah 1980) (holding that contract provision allowing for 
attorney fees includes those fees incurred on appeal as well as at trial). Accordingly, 
Nielsen requests this Court award him all attorney fees and costs incurred on appeal. 
OS 
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, this Court should affirm the district court's entry of 
judgment. In addition, the Court should award Loren Nielsen his attorney fees and costs 
incurred on appeal. 
RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 22st day of April, 2009. 
MILLER GUYMON, P.C. 
Blake D. Miller 
Joel T. Zenger 
Lauren Y. Parry 
Attorneys for Loren Nielsen 
on 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
I hereby certify that, on the 22st day of April 2009,1 caused two tme and correct 
copies of the foregoing APPELLEE BRIEF to be mailed via first-class mail, postage 
prepaid, to the following: 
M. David Eckersley 
Prince Yeates & Geldzahler 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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ADDENDUM "A" 
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Third Judicial District 
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SALT LAKE COUNTY 
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Deputy Clerk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DCH HOLDINGS, LLC, : _ MEMORANDUM DECISION 
Plaintiff, : CASE NO. 050920009 
vs. : 
LOREN NIELSEN, 
Defendant. : 
This matter came before the Court for a hearing on September 18, 
2006, in connection with the parties' cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. 
At the conclusion of the hearing, the Court took the matter under 
advisement to further consider the parties' written submissions, the 
relevant legal authority and counsels' oral argument. Being now fully 
informed, the Court rules as stated herein. 
LEGAL ANALYSIS 
The factual background of this case involves a Real Estate Purchase 
Contract p'REPC") between DCH Holdings (through its principal David D. 
Helms), as buyer, and the defendant, as seller of 2.46 acres. It is 
undisputed that since the defendant's property was unplatted and only a 
portion of the property was to be conveyed under the REPC (2.4 acres out 
of a 9.6 acre parcel), Utah law required that the entire property be 
subdivided and platted. The REPC also contemplated certain governmental 
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approvals being obtained in order for the plaintiff to proceed with its 
planned PUD development project. 
The pivotal issue presented by the parties' dual Motions for Summary 
Judgment is which of the parties was charged with the responsibility of 
subdividing the land and obtaining the requisite approvals for the type 
of development project contemplated by the REPC. 
The plaintiff argues that reading the REPC in light of Utah Code 
Annotated § 10-9a-603, requires the Court to find that the defendant, as 
the landowner, was the only party legally capable of subdividing his 
larger parcel of land. The defendant contends that the subdivision and 
plat recordation process as a whole requires information and 
documentation which only the developer can provide. 
In this case, § 10-9a-603 provides limited guidance because the REPC 
contemplates far more than the mere division of the defendant's land into 
two smaller parcels. Rather, as the defendant points out, the REPC 
contemplates a broader process toward a PUD subdivision involving certain 
adjoining parcels. 
Further, the Sandy City Code cited by the defendant identifies 
numerous documents that must be submitted and duties undertaken in a plat 
subdivision and plat recordation process. However, neither the Utah Code 
nor the Sandy City Code specifically assigns these responsibilities 
solely to the landowner or the developer. In fact, it appears from the 
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Sandy City Code that a number of the duties may be fulfilled by either 
of these parties or may be shared. 
In the absence of an express statutory delegation of duties, the 
parties must themselves reach an agreement on their respective 
obligations. In this case, however, the REPC is silent on this point. 
This silence suggests that the parties may not have reached a meeting of 
the minds on the crucial terms of who would be undertaking which 
responsibility in the subdivision and plat recordation process. This 
issue requires a factual assessment and may involve the introduction of 
parol evidence to discern the parties7 intent. Ultimately, the trier 
of fact will need to consider whether the REPC is an enforceable 
contract, whether the parties timely performed their respective duties 
and whether they acted in good faith. At this point, however, there are 
factual issues on these various points which preclude the Court from 
entering summary judgment. Accordingly, the Court denies both parties' 
cross-Motions for Summary Judgment. 
This Memorandum Decision will stand as the Order of the Court. 
Dated this <A day of October, 2006. 
VA 
TIMOTHY R.( HANSON 
DISTRICT COURT JUDGE 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing Memorandum Decision, to the following, this. ..day of 
October, 2 006: 
James W. McConkie II 
James W. McConkie III 
Wilford A. Beesley III 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake D. Miller 
Joel T. Zenger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
165 S. Regent Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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Tmrd Judicial District 
JUL 2g>2008 
SAW" LAKE COUNTY I 
Deputy C^rk 
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT 
IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH 
DCH HOLDINGS, LLC, - FINDINGS OF FACT, 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW, 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
LOREN NIELSEN, 
AND ORDER 
CASE NO. 050920009 
Defendant : DATE: JULY 28,2008 
This matter came on for trial on June 5, 2008. The Plaintiff was represented by 
M. David Eckersley of Prince, Yeates & Geidzahier and the Defendant was represented 
by Blake D. Miller of Miller Guymon, P.C. Upon hearing the evidence and argument of 
counsel, and good cause appearing, the Court hereby makes the following Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law. 
FINDINGS OF FACT 
1. Loren Nielsen ("Nielsen") owns approximately 9.66 acres of real property 
located in Sandy City, Utah, at 9265 South Monroe Street (the "Undivided Property"). 
2. Prior to May, DCH Holdings, LLC ("DCH") became interested in 
developing a Planned Unit Development townhouse development in Sandy, Utah (the 
"Townhouse Development") on land owned by several different owners. To accomplish 
this purpose, it was necessary for DCH to acquire the land from the various property 
owners on which the Townhouse Project would be located. A portion of the 
land needed for the Townhouse Development was approximately 2.5 acres of the 
Undivided Property (the "Townhouse Parcel"). 
3. DCH is owned principally by David C. Helm. Mr. Helm is a long-standing 
real estate broker and developer. 
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4. Mr. Nielsen is not, and has never been, a real estate professional. 
5. On May 6, 2005, Mr. Helm prepared and presented Mr. Nielsen with (1) a 
Real Estate Purchase Contract- Land (the "Agreement"), which contained DCH's offer 
to purchase an estimated 2.46 acre portion comprising the expected Townhouse Parcel 
for $6.10 per square foot (estimated total of $653,661.36) and (2) an earnest money 
check of $2,500.00. 
6. The offer was accepted on May 6, 2005 in the form prepared by Mr. Helm. 
7. The salient terms of the contract were as follows: 
a. A purchase price of $6.10 per foot (with the exact amount to be 
determined when the exact size was determined later); 
b. $2,500 initial earnest money, with $10,000 to be due upon 
preliminary plat approval; 
c. Closing to be on or before twenty days after final plat approval, with 
an outside date of October 15, 2005; and 
d. The offer was conditioned on the acceptance by an adjoining 
landowner (Terry Thatcher) of an offer to purchase his property. 
e. In case of DCH's default, Mr. Neilsen could elect to retain the 
earnest money as liquidated damages. 
f. In the event of litigation to enforce the Agreement, the prevailing 
party would be entitled to reasonable attorney fees and costs. 
8. At the time the contract was prepared and presented by Mr. Helm, it was 
understood that the Townhouse Parcel was not a separate parcel but part of the larger 
Undivided Property. 
9. At the time the contract was signed, both parties contemplated and 
understood that it was DCH's responsibility to obtain preliminary and final plat approval. 
10. The plat approval process would have resulted in a subdivision of the 
Townhouse Parcel from the Undivided Parcel. 
11. At the time of the execution of the contract, other than for discussions in 
which DCH assumed responsibility for the plat approval process, there were no 
discussions specifically mentioning "subdividing" the Undivided Parcel. 
12. Mr. Helm informed Mr. Nielsen that Mr. Thatcher also accepted Mr. 
Helm's offer. 
13. Following execution of the Contract, Mr, Helm: 
a. Contracted with an engineering company to obtain a survey of the 
proposed Townhouse Development, including the Townhouse Parcel; 
b. Contracted with an engineering company to obtain a topography of 
the Townhouse Development, including the Townhouse Parcel; 
c. Contracted with an engineering company to prepare a subdivision 
plan; 
d. On May 12, 2005, submitted a re-zoning application to Sandy City 
involving the Townhouse Parcel; and 
e. Participated in meetings and hearings with Sandy City regarding 
potential plat and zoning approval relating to the Townhouse Development and 
Townhouse Parcel. 
14. Following Mr. Nielsen's acceptance of the Agreement on May 6, 2005, Mr. 
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Nielsen did not hear from Mr. Helm again until October 14, 2005. 
15. DCH did not obtain either preliminary or final plat approval of the 
Townhouse Development or the Townhouse Parcel. 
16. DCH did not pay the sums under the Agreement due upon plat approval. 
17. At approximately 2:31 p.m. on October 14, 2005, DCH sent a facsimile to 
Mr. Nielsen's office, which informed him that DCH was "closing our half of the closing 
today 10/14/05 at 3:00 p.m." and that DCH had set a closing date for the Nielsens at 
10:00 a.m. on October 17, 2005, at 10:00 a.m. 
18. Mr. Nielsen was not in his office on the afternoon of October 14, 2005. 
He first saw the facsimile late in the day on October 15, 2005. 
19. As of October 15, 2005, DCH had not obtained plat approval, which was 
required for legal transfer of the Townhouse Parcel. 
20. It was DCH's responsibility to obtain plat approval in time to allow a 
closing on or before October 15, 2005. 
CONCLUSIONS OF LAW 
1. Conveyance of the unplatted Townhouse Parcel required approval of a 
subdivision plat, subdividing the Townhouse Parcel from the Undivided Property. 
2. DCH's failure to obtain plat approval within the time to allow a closing by 
October 15, 2005, constituted a breach of the Agreement and excused Mr. Nielsen's 
obligation to perform, including any obligation to convey title to the unplatted Townhouse 
Parcel. 
3. Because conveyance of an unplatted property is a violation of law, the Court 
should not compel Mr. Nielsen to perform an unlawful act. 
4. Mr. Nielsen is entitled to retain the $2,500 earnest money deposit. 
5. DCH's complaint should be dismissed, with prejudice. 
6. Mr. Nielsen is the prevailing party. 
7. Mr. Nielsen is entitled to recover his costs and attorney's fees, in an amount 
to be determined by the Court in accordance with Rule 73 of the Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure. 
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ORDER 
Counsel for the Defendant is directed to prepare and submit to the Court at an 
appropriate time an affidavit of attorneys' fees consistent with Rule 73, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, together with a proposed judgment consistent with these Findings of Fact and 
Conclusions of Law. 
Dated this 9% day of July, 2008. 
l^jg_A,^^p^ 
KATE A. T O O ^ I o g ^ . l 
DISTRICT COURr-iJSP^'/o§ / 
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MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I hereby certify that I mailed a true and correct copy of the foregoing Findings of 
Fact and Conclusions of Law, to the following, this '7$ day of July, 2008: 
James W. McConkie, II 
M. David Eckersley 
Attorneys for Plaintiff 
175 East 400 South, Suite 900 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
Blake D. Miller 
Joel T. Zenger 
Attorneys for Defendant 
165 S. Regent Street 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
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